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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-46b-16(l), 78-2a-3(2)(a) and (j), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. This appeal is taken from an Order of the Utah Labor Commission providing
that Pinnacle Homes, Inc. (hereinafter "Pinnacle Homes") was a statutory employer and
awarding Mr. Glen Ebmeyer (hereinafter "Mr. Ebmeyer") benefits under the statutory
employer analysis against the assets of Pinnacle. Said Labor Commission Order was
challenged in a timely motion for review and was subsequently appealed to the Utah
Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.) Whether the Labor Commission properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was
an "employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(2), allowing Pinnacle
Homes, Inc. to be found to be a statutory employer under Utah Code Ann. §34A-2103(7).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When there is a mixed question of law and fact, the
reviewing Court extends "heightened deference" to the Commission's determinations
"with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review of correctness and
a broad abuse of discretion standard." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n., 939 P.2d 177, 182
(Utah 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court in Drake held that "where the issue is purely factual,
appellate review is highly deferential, requiring reversal only if a finding is clearly
erroneous." Id. at 181 (citation omitted). When reviewing the factual findings of the
4

administrative agency, the reviewing court "will generally reverse only if the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, where the issue
is a question of law, the reviewing court "gives no deference to the trial judge's or
agency's determination, because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what
the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Id. (citations
omitted).
The Court recognized that not all issues fall clearly at one end of the spectrum or
the other, and recognized that some issues involve mixed questions of law and fact. Id.
Although the reviewing court will review the "underlying empirical facts under a
deferential clear error standard," the Court further held the "legal effect of those facts is
the province of the appellate courts, and no deference need be given a trial court's
resolution of such questions of law." Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, an "agency's
application of the law to the facts may, depending on the issue, be reviewed by an
appellate court with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review for
'correctness1 and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Finally, the Court determined that "although the empirical facts of [the
employee's] case are reviewable for clear error, the conclusion as to whether those facts
qualify

[the employee] for workers' compensation benefits...is

reviewable for

correctness." Id.
2.) The Utah Labor Commission's factual findings that Mr. Ebmeyer was an
employee under §34A-2-103(7)(a) and finding that Pinnacle Homes was a general
contractor are not supported by substantial evidence.
5

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Supreme Court in Drake held that "where
the issue is purely factual, appellate review is highly deferential, requiring reversal only if
a finding is clearly erroneous." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181 (citations omitted). When
reviewing the factual findings of the administrative agency, the reviewing court "will
generally reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Id.
(citations omitted).
PRESERVATION ON APPEAL
On March 24, 2005, the Labor Commission issued its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. (Appellate Record Index Number (hereinafter "AR")
143-150).

Pinnacle Homes filed its Motion for Review before the Utah Labor

Commission on April 22, 2005 (AR 151-215). The Labor Commission denied its motion
for review (AR 217-222) on August 29, 2006. Pinnacle Homes filed its Petitioner for
Review on September 28, 2006 (AR 223-225).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Mr. Ebemeyer was injured when he fell from the roof of a
home while working for Platinum Builders/Mel Bagley (hereinafter

"Platinum

Builders"). Mr. Ebmeyer filed an application for hearing at the Utah Labor Commission
seeking benefits as a result of Platinum Builders' failure to carry workers compensation
insurance. The uncontradicted testimony presented to the Labor Commission was that
Mr. Ebmeyer was Platinum Builders' employee. Despite this fact, the Commission held
that Pinnacle Homes was a statutory employer even though the Uninsured Employers
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Fund acknowledged at the hearing that Mr. Ebmeyer was not a Pinnacle Homes
employee.
Course of Proceedings: Mr. Ebmeyer filed his application for hearing. (AR 1-3).
Pinnacle Homes filed its Answer pursuant to an Amended Notice of Formal Adjudicative
Proceeding. (AR 116-126). The ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order on March 24, 2005. (AR 143-150). Pinnacle Homes filed its Motion for
Review on April 22, 2005. (AR 151-215). The Labor Commission filed its Order
Denying Motion for Review on August 29, 2006. (AR 217-222). Pinnacle Homes filed
the instant appeal. (AR 223-225).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Ebmeyer was employed with Platinum Builders as a shingler on new home

construction beginning in January of 2003. (AR 227: P20, L16 through P21, L20).
2.

Mr. Ebmeyer received his work from Mel Beagley at Platinum Builders. (AR

227: P28, L22 through P29, L10).
3.

After Mr. Ebmeyer received the call to appear for work, Mr. Ebmeyer usually

arrived at the worksite with the worksite already stocked and ready for work. (AR 227:
P29,L13-L24).
4.

Mr. Ebmeyer did not work for anyone other than Platinum Builders during the

relevant time period from January of 2003 to when he was injured in August of 2003.
(AR 227: P31, L2 through P32, L3).
5.

Mr. Ebmeyer testified that no one from Pinnacle Homes would ever come out

to the houses he was working on to inspect his work. (AR 227: P36, L20 through P37,
7

L8).
6.

After his injury, Mr. Ebmeyer dealt with Mel Beagley at Platinum Builders in

terms of reporting the injury and in terms of obtaining his last paycheck. (AR 227: P45,
L9 through P46, L2).
7.

Mr. Ebmeyer never received a check from of any form from Pinnacle Homes.

(AR227:P54,L5-L9).
8.

Mr. Ebmeyer never received any materials from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227:

P54,L10-L13).
9.

Mr. Ebmeyer never received any tools or any other supplies from Pinnacle

Homes. (AR227: P54, L14-L17).
10.

Mr. Ebmeyer never received any transportation or directions from Pinnacle

Homes telling him to go to work. (AR 227: P54, LI8 - L24).
11.

Mr. Ebmeyer never received any training from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227:

P57,L12-L20).
12.

Mr. Ebmeyer never received any directions from Pinnacle Homes as to what

house to work on. (AR 227: P57, L21 through P58, L4).
13.

Mr. Ebmeyer testified that he never saw anyone from Pinnacle Homes at any

time at the job site upon which he was working when he suffered his accident. (AR 227:
P72,L16 through P73, L6).
14.

When a representative from Pinnacle Homes was called to testify, he testified

that Mr. Ebmeyer did not notify Pinnacle Homes of his injury, never requested Pinnacle
Homes pay for his medical expenses, and never requested that Pinnacle Homes pay for
8

his lost wages. (AR 227: P76, L3 - L12).
15.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Platinum Builders, a

general contractor, had been hired to put roofs on the houses that Pinnacle Homes owned.
(AR227:P76,L13-L23).
16.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle Homes never

dealt with Mr. Ebmeyer, never called Mr. Ebmeyer, never supervised Mr. Ebmeyer or
any of his work. (AR 227: P77, LI - L9).
17.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle Homes was not

aware that anyone other than Mel Beagley and Platinum Builders was doing the roofs on
the homes owned by Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P80, L8 - L12).
18.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Mr. Beagley and Platinum

Builders were not paid by the hour, but were paid on a lump sum contract. (AR 227:
P80,L13-L18).
19.

A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle Homes did not

direct or control Mr. Beagley or Platinum Builders about how the work was done and left
the inspections of the houses up to the cities. (AR 227: P98, L9 through P99, L5).
20.

With respect to workers compensation insurance, a representative from

Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle Homes does not have any employees and does not
do any of the physical work on the homes it owns. (AR 227: P95, L23 through P96, L6).
21.

Pinnacle Homes had dealt with its insurance agent in obtaining insurance for

the business and was told it did not need workers compensation insurance as a result of
Pinnacle Homes not having any employees. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P97, L21).
9

22.

Pinnacle homes filed its application with the insurance agent notifying her that

it did not have any employees and told the insurance agent that Pinnacle Homes wanted
to opt out of workers compensation coverage. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P97, L21).
23.

When the instant claim arose, the general liability carrier denied the claim as it

already had notice that Pinnacle Homes did not have any employees, as Pinnacle Homes
already had submitted in writing to its insurance agent. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P98,
L8).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Labor Commission did not properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was an
"employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(2), as an employer is
defined as a person "who regularly employs one or more workers." Under § 104(4),
Pinnacle Homes has no employees and cannot be considered an employer under the
definition of the statute. If Pinnacle Homes is not defined as an "employer", §103(7)(a)
would similarly not apply as it applies only to any "person who is an employer ...". If
the person is not an "employer" under the statute, then §103(7)(a) does not apply to
Pinnacle Homes in the instant case.
The Commission's analysis of "supervision or control" was better geared to the
only general contractor in the case - Platinum Builders. It was inappropriate to consider
Pinnacle Homes a general contractor without defining what a general contractor is and
without providing a factual basis for considering Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor
for merely hiring a professional general contractor to place a roof on the home it owned.
As a result, any analysis of Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor is misplaced and not
10

supported either in law or fact and this Court should overturn the Commission ruling with
respect to the legal conclusion that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE LABOR COMMISSION IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT PINNACLE
HOMES WAS AN "EMPLOYER" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2104(4)
The Labor Commission did not properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was an

"employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(2), as an employer is
defined as a person "who regularly employs one or more workers." Under § 104(4),
Pinnacle Homes has no employees and cannot be considered an employer under the
definition of the statute. If Pinnacle Homes is not defined as an "employer", §103(7)(a)
would similarly not apply as it applies only to any "person who is an employer ...". If
the person is not an "employer" under the statute, then §103(7)(a) does not apply to
Pinnacle Homes in the instant case.
The Labor Commission Board of Appeals found Pinnacle Homes to be Mr.
Ebmeyer's statutory employer under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(4) by providing that
Pinnacle Homes did not provide written evidence to its workers compensation carrier that
it was opting out of workers compensation. See, Order Denying Motion for Review, AR
217-222, Page 3. As a result, the Labor Commission determined that Pinnacle Homes
was an employer under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(2) and liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's
injury under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(7)(a). Id at Pages 3-4.
The concurring opinion put it succinctly when it provided the following:
I concur in the result. However, I am disturbed by the majority's heavy reliance
11

upon Section 34A-2-104(4). Pinnacle is a corporation whose only employees,
within the meaning of § 104(4), are directors or officers. By enacting this section,
the Utah Legislature has clearly established the public policy that certain limited,
corporate employees may be exempt from workers' compensation coverage.
However, it is impossible for a corporation similarly situated as Pinnacle to
comply with the notice requirements of § 104(b) because Pinnacle has no insurance
carrier to notify, in writing, of Pinnacle's desire to exempt its officers and
directors from coverage and as "employees' [sic] under the Act. The majority's
decision possibly creates a strange option for corporations such as Pinnacle; they
could either send a written notification to any workers' compensation insurance
carrier which essentially says "thanks, we chose you as our insurance carrier, but
we do not need workers' compensation coverage because we are electing to
exempt all our officers and directors, which are our only employees, from
coverage", or these corporations may have to resign themselves always to being
"employers" under §103(7)(a). (Order Denying Motion for Review, AR 217-222,
Page 4).
Pinnacle complied with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(4) when it provided written
notification to its insurance agent that it would be opting out of workers compensation
coverage.

Specifically, the only testimony on the subject was provided by Brad

Liljenquist, a representative from Pinnacle Homes, before the Labor Commission.
Mr. Liljenquist testified on Pinnacle Homes' behalf as follows:
Q: Does Pinnacle Homes have any employees?
A: They do not.
Q: Has Pinnacle Homes ever had any employees?
A: No.
Q: Does Pinnacle Homes ever actually do any of the physical work on any of the
homes it owns?
A: No.
***

Q: When you first organized this business, did you attempt to obtain all the
insurance coverage that you needed?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: How did you do that?
A: I went to the office of our insurance agent, Wendy Dean Marshall, I believe is
her name, and told her what Pinnacle Homes Utah, Inc., was going to do, told her
12

about the organizational structure and asked her to provide us with the insurance
coverages that we needed.
Q: Did she make any queries as to whether or not Pinnacle Homes had any
employees?
A: She did.
Q: And what did you tell her?
A: / told her that we did not have employees.
Q: And did you file applications as such with her?
A: Yes.
Q: Did she then tell you what type of insurance you needed?
A: She did. She—she said that we would need general liability insurance,
insurance on our - on a little office space that we rent, and - and she told - on the
workers compensation, she said that since we were all owners of the corporation
that we would not - we would not be required to purchase workers compensation
insurance; we could opt out of it.
Q: And did you in fact opt out of it?
A: I told Wendy that we wanted to opt out of it.
Q: Okay. And so did you - did you obtain insurance for the business?
A: We did.
Q: And once you received notice that this application was filed, did you turn that
over to them?
A: Yes.
Q: And what did they tell you?
A: They told us that it was the general liability insurance that was submitted to,
and they told us that they - that we were not covered under that policy for workers
compensation.
Q: And why? Did they tell you why? Because you didn't have any employees?
A: We didn't have any employees.
(AR 227: P95, L23 through P98, L8) (emphasis added).
This was the only evidence presented on the issue. As determined from the
testimony, Pinnacle Homes provided written notification to the insurance agent that it did
not have any employees and subsequently opted out of workers compensation coverage.
This is enough to comply with Section 104(4) and enough to remove Pinnacle Homes
from an "employer" status in the instant case.
It appears that Subsection 104(4)(b) is a provision to exclude corporate officers
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when there are other employees working for the corporation.

In that situation, the

directors of the corporation notify the workers compensation carrier that it will cover
employees, but not the directors of the corporation. In this situation alone does it make
sense that the directors of the corporation would have to notify its workers compensation
carrier of the employees to cover and which personnel not to cover.
Otherwise, the concurring opinion is true. Why would you notify a workers
compensation carrier that you do not need their services for you corporation when the
entire corporation has no employees and only consists of directors, who have chosen not
to receive workers compensation coverage? It does not make sense to provide said
written notice to a workers compensation carrier when the only personnel of a
corporation are its directors who have opted out of coverage.
The Labor Commission relied upon Olsen v. Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.2d
257 (Utah 1998) for its determination that Pinnacle Homes needed to provide notification
to its workers compensation carrier. See, Order Denying Motion for Review, AR 217222, Page 3. Olsen, however, is immediately distinguishable due to the fact the employer
in Olsen had more than one employee and the director of the company wanted to reduce
his premiums by excluding himself from coverage. 956 P.2d at 258. Because the
employer in Olsen had other employees and failed to comply with 104(b), the Court ruled
in favor of coverage and allowed for workers compensation benefits.
In the instant case, there were no other employees. There were only the directors
of the Pinnacle Homes and, therefore, there was no workers compensation carrier to
provide written notification of their election out of workers compensation coverage. This
14

is entirely distinguishable from the facts in Olsen, which is what the Commission relied
upon when it found Pinnacle Homes to be an "employer" under the statute. Outside of
§ 104(b), there is no other requirement that written notification be provided in a case
where the company has no employees and is made up entirely of directors and/or
shareholders.
It makes sense when a company has regular employees to provide coverage for the
employees but not the directors in order to minimize the cost of the insurance coverage.
In this situation alone would you need to provide a written list under §104(4)(b) about
who should be covered and who does not need coverage. The statute itself specifies that
a writing is necessary in this instance alone.
The Labor Commission did not properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was an
"employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(2), as an employer is
defined as a person "who regularly employs one or more workers." Under § 104(4),
Pinnacle Homes has no employees and cannot be considered an employer under the
definition of the statute. If Pinnacle Homes is not defined as an "employer", §103(7)(a)
would similarly not apply as it applies only to any "person who is an employer ...". If
the person is not an "employer" under the statute, then §103(7)(a) does not apply to
Pinnacle Homes in the instant case.
For reasons of concern provided in the concurring opinion of the Labor
Commission Order Denying Motion for Review and for the reasons listed above,
Pinnacle Homes is not an "employer" as defined by the statute and, therefore, cannot be a
statutory employer under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(7)(a). This Court, therefore,
15

should reverse the Labor Commission ruling and enter an order removing Pinnacle
Homes from any liability below as Pinnacle Homes is not an "employer" under the
statutes of this state.
A.

PINNACLE HOMES ALSO IS NOT MR- EBMEYER'S OR
PLATINUM
BUILDER'S
EMPLOYER
UNDER
THE
TRADITIONAL 'RIGHT TO CONTROL TEST'

Although the Board of Appeals did not address the issue of whether Mr. Ebmeyer
and/or Platinum Builders were employees of Pinnacle Homes, the underlying decision,
however, utilized the word "operative" in awarding benefits. The ALJ misinterpreted the
definition of the word "operative" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104 to include
an independent contractor for purposes of workers compensation coverage.
According to the ALJ, an operative is considered to be an employee if the
operative is in the service of an employer. As noted above, Pinnacle Homes was not an
"employer" and, therefore, the analysis in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(l)(b) should not
apply to it. §104(l)(b) provides that "each person in the service of any employer, as
defined in Section 34A-2-103, who employes one or more workers or operatives
regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment under a contract for
hire..." (Emphasis added).
Even if the Court applies this test for operatives to the instant case, Mr. Ebmeyer
was not an operative or an employee for workers compensation purposes with respect to
Pinnacle Homes.
Under § 34A-2-103(7)(a), in order to find a person is a statutory employer of the
listed parties, the following findings must be made: 1) the person is an employer; 2) the
16

person/employer procured work to be done wholly or in part for the person by a
contractor; 3) the person/employer retains supervision or control over the work of the
contractor; and 4) the work to be done is a part or process in the trade or business of the
person/employer.
The term "employer" for the purposes of the Workers Compensation Act and the
Utah Occupational Disease Act is generally defined in § 34A-2-103(2). Under § 34A-2103(2), a person who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment under any contract of hire, express or
implied, oral or written, is considered an employer. Accordingly, a person or business is
not an employer until they have a person who is an employee.
Under § 34A-2-104(l)(b), the terms "employee", "worker", and "operative" have
the same definition of "each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section
34A-2-103. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the analysis to determine
employer and employee status under § 34A-2-103(2) and § 34A-2-104(1) turns on the
traditional "right to control" test. See, Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 429
(Utah 1986); Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Comm'n, 562 P.2d 227, 228-29 (Utah 1977);
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77ffl[9-10, 985 P.2d 243.
This is distinct from the analysis of the "supervision or control" element for
statutory employers under § 34A-2-103(7)(a), which examines supervision or control
under a much less exacting standard. See, Bennett, 726 P.2d at 431-32; Utah Home Fire
Ins. Co., 1999 UT 77 at ^[17 n. 8.
The ALJ never made a finding of fact that Pinnacle Homes was an "employer"
17

within the meaning of § 34A-2-103(2). The ALJ never made an analysis of Pinnacle
Homes' status as an "employer" within the framework of the right to control test as
required under §§ 34A-2-103(2) and 104(1) and the controlling case law.
As discussed above in Section I, the three officers of Pinnacle Homes have opted
out of employee status pursuant to § 34A-2-104(4). Accordingly, for the purposes of the
Workers Compensation Act and the Utah Occupational Disease Act, these persons are
not employees of Pinnacle Homes and Pinnacle Homes is not an "employer" under the
statutes.
The ALJ held the term "operative", which is the same definition as "employee"
and "worker" under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(l)(b), includes "those persons that
bring about the employer's desired effect." There is no legal support for this addition to
the statutory definition. Further, the closest language to this proposition is contained in
the definition of an "independent contractor" under § 34A-2-103(2)(a) in which it states
that the independent contractor is "subject to the employer only in effecting a result in
accordance with the employer's design." Such an expansion of the meaning of a term is
improper as it would improperly include all independent contractors as operatives, and by
definition employees, which is not permitted or recognized by the statutes.
The testimony at hearing was that Platinum Builders were independent
contractors. Mr. Ebmeyer testified that Platinum Builders was an independent contractor,
that he received his instructions from Mel Beagley, owner of Platinum Builders, and that
he would be told to go shingle specific homes. (AR 227: P56, L7 through P59, L3).
Scott Lawrence, an owner and vice president of operations of Pinnacle Homes, testified
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that he contracted with Platinum Builders to put a roof on the house from which Mr.
Ebmeyer fell. (AR 227: P74, L23 through P76, L25).
Platinum Builders was a general contractor and Mr. Beagley was an
owner/operator of the business. (AR 227: P78, LI 1 through P79, LI). Mr. Beagley had
liability insurance and stated that he had opted out of workers compensation as the owner
of the company. (AR 227: P79, L7-14).
Pinnacle Homes never provided materials for Platinum Builders' work on Pinnacle
Homes' property. (AR 227: P79, LI5-19). Pinnacle Homes did not provide supplies or
tools to Platinum. (AR 227: P79, L20-22). Pinnacle Homes did not supervise or control
Mr. Beagley or Platinum Builders in any fashion or tell him when, how or what work he
should be doing. (AR 227: P79, L23 through P80, L4). Pinnacle Homes did not provide
transportation and was not aware that anyone other than Mr. Beagley was doing work on
Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P80, L5-12). Pinnacle paid for the work done by Platinum
on a lump sum contract basis and did not withhold taxes or any other benefits. (AR 227:
P80,L13 through P81,L4).
There were no facts presented by any party to suggest that Platinum Builder had
somehow become an employee of Pinnacle Homes. All the facts presented, which were
not contradicted and were not opposed, presented evidence to the effect that Platinum
Builder was an independent contractor and separate from Pinnacle Homes .rather than an
independent contractor.
By statutory definition, an independent contractor means any person engaged in
the performance of work for another who, while so engaged, is:
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i) independent of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work;
ii) not subject to the routine rule or control of the employer;
iii) engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work; and
iv) subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the
employer's design.
§34A-2-103(2)(a).
Based on the facts cited above, neither Platinum Builders nor Mr. Ebmeyer can be
considered employees of Pinnacle Homes. Pinnacle Homes did not maintain any right to
control the execution of the work. Pinnacle Homes did not supervise or regularly inspect
the work that was being performed. Platinum Builders was engaged in a specific piece of
work, which was the installation of a roof. Finally, Platinum was only subordinate to
Pinnacle Homes in that Platinum was effecting a result in accordance with Pinnacle
Homes' design. By definition, then, Platinum Builders and Mr. Ebmeyer cannot be
considered Pinnacle Homes employees under the traditional employee test espoused by
Utah courts.
As noted above, Pinnacle Homes can only be an employer if it has employees.
The owners/officers had opted out of employee status pursuant to § 34A-2-104(4).
Platinum Builders and/or Mr. Ebmeyer were not employees pursuant to the
uncontradicted evidence. There were no allegations that any other persons could be
considered employees of Pinnacle Homes within the meaning of § 34A-2-103(2) and
104(l)(b).

Accordingly, Pinnacle Homes does not regularly employ one or more

operatives, and by definition cannot be an employer for the purposes of § 34A-2-103(7).
II.

EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT PINNACLE HOMES IS
CONSIDERED AN "EMPLOYER", THE LABOR COMMISSION ERRED
IN FINDING THAT PINNACLE HOMES HAD ANY SUPERVISION OR
20

CONTROL OVER PLATINUM BUILDERS THAT WARRANTS A
FINDING THAT MR. EBMEYER WAS PINNACLE HOMES' EMPLOYEE
The Utah Labor Commission's factual findings that Mr. Ebmeyer was an
employee under §34A-2-103(7)(a) are not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ
determined that Pinnacle Homes was the general contractor and retained sufficient
"supervision or control" over the work of Platinum Builders such that Mr. Ebmeyer was
considered to be the employee of Pinnacle Homes under §103(7)(a) and liable for his
injuries and expenses.
When reviewing the factual findings of the administrative agency, the reviewing
court "will generally reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181 (citations omitted). The Court recognized that not all
issues fall clearly at one end of the spectrum or the other, and recognized that some issues
involve mixed questions of law and fact. Id. Although the reviewing court will review
the "underlying empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard," the Court further
held the "legal effect of those facts is the province of the appellate courts, and no
deference need be given a trial court's resolution of such questions of law." Id. (citation
omitted).
Because the Labor Commission on review focused exclusively on whether
Pinnacle Homes was an "employer" under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(4), it did not
focus on whether Pinnacle Homes retained supervision or control over Platinum Builders
to allow for the "statutory employer" designation under §103(7)(a). As such, Pinnacle
Homes must focus on the ALJ's findings and conclusions in this regard.
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The ALJ determined that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor and, as such,
was responsible for Mr. Ebmeyer's injuries.

The ALJ further found that because

Pinnacle Homes retained supervision and control over the project, Mr. Ebmeyer was an
"employee" under § 34A-2-103(7)(a).

Under Bennett, the ALJ determined that

supervision or control "requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate control
over the project." Bennett, 726 P.2d at 432 (citations omitted).
The uncontradicted testimony provided at the hearing was that Platinum Builders
was a general contractor with a general contractors license. (AR 227: P81, L l l through
P82, LI6). Pinnacle Homes, as the owner of the home in question, contracted with
Platinum Builders, a general contractor, to oversee the completion of putting a roof on the
home owned by Pinnacle Homes. As a result thereof, the analysis utilized for Pinnacle
Homes should have been directed at Platinum Builders as the general contractor in charge
of placing the roof on the house. Platinum Builders was responsible for this overall
project and, as such, any statutory employer analysis should not have included Pinnacle
Homes.
In this regard, Pinnacle Homes does not fit the general definition of a general
contractor. Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(18). Normally, a general contractor is hired by
a client and is paid a fixed amount pursuant to a master contract with the builder. The
general contractor makes money off the margin of what it would cost him to sub-contract
the work out and the overall master contract.
In this case, Pinnacle Homes is the owner of the property and should not be
considered the general contractor as Pinnacle Homes was not hired as a general
22

contractor, but was building a home it hoped to sell on the open market. In this respect,
Pinnacle Homes was its own client and contracted with a general contractor, Platinum
Builders, to construct a roof on the home Pinnacle owned.
In turn, Platinum Builders received a contract rate and sub-contracted to Mr.
Ebmeyer. Platinum Builders made money off the margin of the contract amount and
what it was willing to pay Mr. Ebmeyer, which is the traditional role of a general
contractor.
The sole reason the ALJ concluded that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor
was because it contracted with Platinum Builders to put a roof on the building in
question. That was it. From this one determination, the ALJ then ruled that Pinnacle
Homes was a statutory employer and liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's industrial injury. From a
policy standpoint, any real estate investor who purchases a home to fix it up and sell it on
the market is now a general contractor if the real estate investor contracts with a general
contractor to repair or construct anything on the home.
Pinnacle Homes does not believe that contracting with a licensed general contactor
to do a job that is less than building the full house makes the home owner a general
contractor and subject to liability. Pinnacle Homes believes this ruling is too broad and
would subject numerous unintending persons and entities to unlimited liability if a
general contractor's employee gets injured while working on the home.
A,

THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT PINNACLE HOMES WAS A
GENERAL CONTRACTOR WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The uncontradicted testimony provided at the hearing was that Platinum Builders
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was a general contractor with a general contractor's license. (AR 227: P81, LI 1 through
P82, LI6). The ALJ utilized the fact that Pinnacle Homes contracted with Platinum
Builders to place a roof on the house as proof positive that Pinnacle Homes was a general
contractor itself.

(AR 227: P81, L l l through P84, L3).

Because Pinnacle Homes

contracted with Platinum Builders, the ALJ extended a legal definition, general
contractor, to Pinnacle Homes in this transaction.
Again, Pinnacle homes contracted with a general contractor to do a job that was
less than the whole of the house, but was necessary for Pinnacle Homes as the owner of
the house to sell the house. The analysis should have been whether Platinum Builders, as
the general contractor, had supervision and control over putting the roof on the house,
which it did.

The uncontradicted testimony at the hearing provided that Platinum

Builders were not paid by the hour, but were paid on a lump sum contract. (AR 227:
P80, LI3 - LI8). That Pinnacle Homes did not direct or control Mr. Beagley or Platinum
Builders about how the work was done and left the inspections of the houses up to the
cities and to Platinum Builders. (AR 227: P98, L9 through P99, L5).
If the definition of a general contractor is a person who owns a property, but does
not live in it, and makes a renovation or addition to the home in preparation for sale of
the home, then may more people would be considered general contractor despite the
statutory provisions that must be met in order to be a general contractor.
The ALJ determined that Pinnacle Homes was the general contractor.

See,

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, AR 143-150, Page 2. The ALJ
determined that because Platinum Builders was a subcontractor who employed Mr.
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Ebmeyer, Mr. Ebmeyer was the statutory employee of Pinnacle Homes.

Id.

Consequently, the ALJ applied the holding in Bennett to award benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer
and to find Pinnacle Homes partially responsible for said benefits.
The ALJ's decision relied heavily on Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427
(Utah 1986). In Bennett, the focus was on a general contractor, whose business was
construction. Id. at 431. There is nothing to suggest the general contractor earned money
doing anything other than getting paid for construction work. There was no evidence to
suggest that the general contractor was working on a project which it owned or had any
interest in, other than getting paid for the act of building.
On those facts, a general contractor who subcontracts for the performance of a
portion of the construction work which it has undertaken retains sufficient supervision or
control to meet the relaxed standard under § 34A-2-103(7). However, those are not the
facts in the instant case.
Pinnacle Homes did not accept or seek a job to do construction work. Pinnacle
Homes' work was not to perform construction. Pinnacle Homes specifically retained
others to perform any necessary construction work. Pinnacle Homes' sole business was
the selling of homes.

Because Pinnacle Homes hired Platinum Builders, the ALJ

immediately found that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor, despite the fact there
was no evidence presented that Pinnacle Homes was a traditional general contractor.
Even if Pinnacle Homes was deemed to be an employer, the work being performed
by Platinum Builders was not construction. Pinnacle Homes' owners/officers did not
engage in or participate in any construction work. (AR 227: P88, L21 through P89, L7).
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This presents a different situation than in the Bennett case.
In Bennett, an admitted general contractor was held responsible for payment of
benefits for the employee of a sub-contractor because the sub-contracted portion was part
of the general contractor's trade or business. Id at 431-32. Realistically, if a subcontractor fails to perform its work, a general contractor has its own employees who can
step in and perform the work. Pinnacle Homes does not have anyone who engages in
construction work.

If Platinum Builders had failed to complete its scope of work,

Pinnacle Homes did not have anyone to send to finish the job. They would have had to
find someone else to finish the work because Pinnacle Homes does not engage in
construction activities and is not a general contractor.
There was no evidence entertained or presented at the hearing that would have
allowed the ALJ to consider Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor.

There is no

definition of "general contractor" in the workers compensation statutes and the language
in Bennett does not provide a clear analysis of what should be considered a general
contractor. With the absence of any evidence presented as to what a general contractor is
expected to do and what the definition of a general contractor is, the Labor Commission
erred by finding that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor.
The problem is proving a negative - if there is no evidence presented as to what a
general contractor is, how can the Commission rule that Pinnacle Homes was a general
contractor and how can Pinnacle Homes disprove the ruling that it was a general
contractor. The undisputed facts remain that Pinnacle Homes owned the home worked
on by Platinum Builders. As an owner it contracted with a general contractor to place a
26

roof on the home Pinnacle Homes owned. To make the leap that Pinnacle Homes is now
a general contractor, absent any definition regarding the same, was an error and
supported by the evidence presented at the trial. The fact that Pinnacle Homes contracted
with Platinum Builders does not automatically make Pinnacle Homes a general
contractor.
The Commission's analysis of "supervision or control" was better geared to the
only general contractor in the case - Platinum Builders. It was inappropriate to consider
Pinnacle Homes a general contractor without defining what a general contractor is and
without providing a factual basis for considering Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor
for merely hiring a professional general contractor to place a roof on the home it owned.
As a result, any analysis of Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor is misplaced and not
supported either in law or fact and this Court should overturn the Commission ruling with
respect to the legal conclusion that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor..
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Pinnacle Homes requests this Court overturn the
Commission's determination that Pinnacle Homes was an "employer" as Pinnacle Homes
was not considered an employer under §34A-2-103(2). Even if this Court finds that
Pinnacle Homes was an "employer" under the Workers Compensation Statutes, Pinnacle
Homes requests this Court overturn the Commission Order holding Pinnacle Homes
liable as a general contractor as there was no evidence as to what a general contractor is
and whether Pinnacle Homes matched that definition.
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an
addendum is included herewith.
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

GLEN M EBMEYER,
Petitioner,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.
PLATINUM BUILDERS/MEL BEAGLEY
and/or UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND;
PINNACLE HOMES INC and/or
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
Respondents.

Case No. 2003919
Judge Dale W Sessions

THIS MATTER came before the Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, on August 30, 2004 at 11:29 AM. The hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of
the Commission. The Honorable Dale W Sessions, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter
"ALJ") presided. The petitioner, Glen M Ebmeyer, was present and represented by his/her
attorney Timothy Allen Esq. The Respondents Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley, was not present
; and Pinnacle Homes Inc, and Uninsured Employers Fund were represented by attorney
Theodore Kanell Esq, and Elliot R Lawrence Esq.
Having failed to appear to defend the action following appropriate notice, default was
entered on the record against Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley.
THE ALJ having in mind the testimony and other evidence before it, now enters
FINDINGS OF FACT
in this matter as follows:
1. Petitioner was injured while he was working for Respondents Pinnacle Homes,
Inc., Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley on August 11, 2003.
2. Petitioner was acting in the scope and course of his employment at the time he
was injured. He was roofing a home when a gust of wind swept him off of the
roof.
3. The nature of Petitioner's injuries include injury to both heels, wrist and elbow of
the right hand/arm.
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4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

At the time of injury, Petitioner was earning $ 15-$ 18 per hour working
approximately 40 hours per week, with an average weekly rate of $500.00. His
compensation rate is $334.00 per week.
At the time of the injury, Petitioner was not married and had no dependent
children.
Petitioner remained off work from the date of his injury to the present time. He
claims temporary total disability for the maximum allowed period of time, to wit
312 weeks.
Petitioner has not yet reached stability or maximum medical improvement for his
injuries. His disability has not yet been rated.
Respondent is a statutory employer within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., §34A2-103. Stated another way, because Petitioner was an employee of the subcontractor, he is a statutory employee of the general contractor in this instance.
Respondents hired Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley to work for them on
homes which they built to sell. The homes were not private residences of any
principle of the Respondent Pinnacle Homes, Inc., but were built for the purpose
of selling the completed homes for profit.
Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley was contracted to put a roof on a house in
Saratoga Springs. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was the general contractor. They subcontract to Platinum Home Builders.
Petitioner was an employee of Platinum Builders and thereby a statutory
employee of Pinnacle Homes, Inc.
The Corporation of Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was established in 2002. The
principles of the corporation have opted out of workers compensation coverage
for themselves. This they are permitted to do under the law. However, they
cannot escape the purposes and intent of the legislature in requiring that
employees be covered for the injuries that they receive as a direct result of their
employment.
Pinnacle Homes, Inc., retained indirect control over the Petitioner. They alone
decided who to hire as a sub-contractor on the specific homes within their
business plan. Whether they exercised direct control over who the sub-contractor
would hire is another matter.
There is insufficient evidence to determine whether Platinum Builders and/or Mel
Beagley is solvent or not. Therefore, the Uninsured Employers Fund faces the
obligation to pay whatever Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley fails to pay, with
their right to proceed in contribution from Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley
intact. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is solvent, is an ongoing business and optimistic
about the future of their business enterprise.
Mr. Ebmeyer testified that he did not sign the Master Service Agreement. His
testimony is credible on that issue. His signature is not the same as on other
documents in the Commission file including the Application for Hearing.
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16.

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Further, it appears that someone attempted the signature on the wrong line, and
then re-created the signature below the false start attempt at the signature
Petitioner was able to work alone with Mel Beagley coming occasionally to see
him at a job site. On occasion, a truck belonging to Pinnacle Homes, Inc., would
drive through the area. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was the owner of the house
Petitioner was working on at the time he was injured.
Pinnacle Homes, Inc., truck containing a person presumably from that company
arrived once to ask if Petitioner was going to be fixing another home nearby. It is
clear that Pinnacle Homes, Inc., had an expectation that Petitioner would be
working on another project.
Petitioner worked on 6 different homes belonging to Pinnacle Homes, Inc.
Petitioner has not obtained an impairment rating and an opinion about
stabilization because he cannot afford it.
Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is an ongoing and profitable business, presumable capable
of paying some or all of the benefits awarded to Petitioner.
Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley is/are still in business, presumably in a
profitable status and capable of paying some or all benefits awarded to Petitioner.

The ALJ having first entered findings of fact, now enters
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
in this matter as follows:
22. Each person in the service of any employer who employs one or more workers or
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, is an employee.
Utah Code Ami §34A-2-104(l)(b). An operative is includes those persons that
bring about the employers desired effect.
23. In this case, Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley was an operative of Pinnacle
Homes, Inc. Testimony showed that it was a course and design of Pinnacle
Homes Inc., to sub-contract work for their business enterprise. Petitioner worked
on approximately 6 different homes for Pinnacle Homes, Inc. It appears that they
may be seeking to avoid paying taxes, benefits and for maintaining workers
compensation insurance on direct employees, so they use operatives instead.
24. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is liable for the costs of injury because they are a statutory
employer within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., §35-1-42(2) which states:
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for
him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer,
such contractor, all persons employed by him, all subcontractors under
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him, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are
considered employees of the original employer.
25. Quoting in depth from Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah
1986): According to Professor Larson, statutes of this kind were passed "to
protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing
ultimate liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it
within his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and
insist upon appropriate compensation protection for their workers." Larson, supra,
§ 49.14. A secondary purpose of these statutes was "to forestall evasion of
[workmen's compensation acts] by those who might be tempted to subdivide their
regular operations among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment
relations with the workers . . . . " Id. § 49.15.
Under § 35-1-42(2), a subcontractor's employee is deemed an employee of
the general contractor if (1) the general contractor retains some supervision or
control over the subcontractor's work, and (2) the work done by the subcontractor
is a "part or process in the trade or business of the employer." E.g., Pinter
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 307 (Utah 1984); Rustler Lodge v.
Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d at 228-29; Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v.
Ashton, 538 P.2d at 318 (1975).
A subcontractor's work is "part or process in the trade or business of the
employer," if it is part of the operations which directly relate to the successful
performance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise. Pinter
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309; Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d
1128, 1131 (Utah 1977); King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636, 640-41, 30 A.2d 549,
552 (1943). The trade or business of a general contractor in the construction
business is construction, Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994, 996 (1972);
Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 289, 508 P.2d 805, 807
(1973); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1214, 1223 (1944), and any portion of the general
contractor's construction project which is subcontracted out will ordinarily be
considered "part or process in the trade or business of the general contractor.
The requirement in § 35-1-42(2) that the general contractor, as a "statutory
employer," retain "supervision or control" over the work of the subcontractor who
hired the "statutory employee" cannot, by {726 P.2d 432} definition, be equated
with the common law standard for determining whether a person is an employee
or an independent contractor. In dealing with "statutory" employees, the statute
begins with the proposition that the claimant qualifies as an employee of the
subcontractor. But the statutory requirement that the general contractor have
"supervision or control" over the work of the subcontractor cannot mean that the
subcontractor must also qualify as an employee of the general contractor. That
would be at least highly improbable and perhaps impossible by definition. Rather,
the term "supervision or control" requires only that the general contractor retain
ultimate control over the project. Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at
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309. As stated in Nochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d
944(1968),
Although the construction process requires the general contractor to
delegate to a greater or lesser degree to subcontractors, the general contractor
remains responsible for successful completion of the entire project and of
necessity retains the right to require that subcontractors perform according to
specifications. The power to supervise or control the ultimate performance of
subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor retain
supervision or control over the subcontractor. See Pinter Construction Co. v.
Frisby, supra, 678 P.2d at 309. See generally Tanner Companies v. Superior
Court, 144 Ariz. 141, 146, 696 P.2d 693, 698 (1985) (Feldman, J., dissenting).
Therefore, as long as a subcontractor's work is a part or process of the general
contractor's business, an inference arises that the general contractor has retained
supervision or control over the subcontractor sufficient to meet the requirement of
§ 35-1-42(2). See Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 316, 172
P.2d 136,140(1946).
Finally, we note that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation Act supports the conclusion that § 35-1-42(2) should be construed
in favor of protecting the employee. E.g., Pinter Construction, 678 P.2d at 307;
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d at 225, 364 P.2d at
1022 (1961); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 187-88, 290 P.2d
692, 693-94 (1955). The Arizona Supreme Court, in construing an almost
identical statutory provision, has stated that it "is a legislatively created scheme by
which conceded nonemployees are deliberately brought within the coverage of the
[Workmen's Compensation] Act." Young v. Environmental Air Products, Inc., 136
Ariz. 158, 161, 665 P.2d 40, 43 (1983). Accord Larson, supra, § 49.00. Wisconsin
has also recognized the broad scope of its similar statute:
The entire statutory scheme indicates a desire on the part of the legislature
to extend the protection of these laws to those who might not be deemed
employees (726 P.2d 433} under the legal concepts governing the liability of a
master for the tortious acts of his servant. Price County Telephone Co. v. Lord,
47 Wis. 2d 704, 715-16, 177 N.W.2d 904, 910 (1970) (footnote omitted).
26. In sum, it is well established that when an employer has retained the right to
control the work of a worker's compensation claimant (such as select the subcontractor in the first place) the claimant is the employer's employee for workers
compensation purposes. In detercnining whether the employee has retained the
right of control the factors to consider include: the right to direct performance of
the work, the right to hire and fire, responsibility for payment of wages and
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providing necessary equipment. But these factors are not inclusive and one factor
is completely controlling. Johnson Brothers Construction v. Labor Commission,
967 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah App. 1998). Ultimately it is the right to control that is
determinative. "It is not the actual exercise of control that determines whether an
employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to control that is
determinative." Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1995).
27. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is the employer of Petitioner in this instance and should be
liable for the injuries to Petitioner.
THE ALJ having first entered findings of fact and conclusions of law now enters the
ORDER
of the Labor Commission as follows:
28. Respondent Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley is hereby defaulted.
29. Respondents Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley and Pinnacle Homes, Inc., are
jointly and severally liable for the injuries, lost wages and medical costs of
Petitioner as his employer(s).
30. Jurisdiction over the Uninsured Employers Fund of Utah is reserved.
31. Petitioner is awarded temporary total disability payments of $334.00 per week
from August 11, 2003 until he is medically stable not to exceed 312 weeks. This
amount is computed using $500 per week average weekly wage as stipulated at
hearing.
32. Petitioner is awarded compensation that includes payment of his medical bills that
are reasonably related to his industrial injury.
33. Petitioner is awarded 8% interest on payments due him in this order from the time
they are accrued and/or due until paid in full.
34. Petitioner's attorney, Timothy Allen, Esq., is awarded attorney fees established by
the rules and sliding scale of the Labor Commission for meaningful services in this
case. His fee is to be paid directly out of the award to Petitioner and paid to him
directly. Likewise as each payment becomes due, a separate check will be sent to
Mr. Allen for his fee.
DATED March 24, 2005.

' / h^7 .^."O* .A

Dale Wgp^sions
Administrate Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
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A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on March 24, 2005, to the persons/parties at
the following addresses:
Glen M Ebmeyer
330N800WApt2
Salt Lake City UT 84116
Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley
Box 1384
RivertonUT 84065
Pinnacle Homes Inc
479 W 300 N
American Fork UT 84003
Uninsured Employers Fund
160E300S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Timothy Allen Esq
350S400EN113
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Theodore Kanell Esq
136 E S Temple Ste 1700

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
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Salt Lake City UT 84111
Barry N Johnson Esq
3865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300
Salt Lake City UT 84109
Elliot R Lawrence Esq
160E200S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114

UTAH LABORTC

division
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615

^FC0¥EC
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

GLEN M. EBMEYER,
Petitioner,
ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.
PLATINUM BUILDERS, INC.,
PINNACLE HOMES, INC., and
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,

Case No. 03-0919

Respondents.

Pinnacle Homes, Inc. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review
Administrative Law Judge Sessions' determination that Pinnacle shares liability with Platinum
Builders, Inc. for Glen M. Ebmeyer's medical and disability benefits under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
While working as a roofer for Platinum Builders, Inc.l on August 11,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer fell
and suffered serious injuries. On September 19, 2003, Mr. Ebmeyer filed an application to compel
Platinum to pay workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. On June 23, 2004, Mr. Ebmeyer
added Pinnacle Homes, Inc. as a respondent in its capacity as the owner and builder of the house
where the accident occurred. Mr. Ebmeyer also added the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF'') as a
respondent because neither Platinum nor Pinnacle carried workers' compensation insurance.2
Judge Sessions held an evidentiary hearing in this matter on August 24,2004. On March 24,
2005, he awarded benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer and held Platinum and Pinnacle jointly and severally
liable for those benefits. Platinum was held liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer. Pinnacle was
held liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" pursuant to §34A-2-103(7) of the Act.

1 Judge Sessions' decision refers to "Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley." However, the record
indicates that Platinum Builders was a Utah corporation in good standing at the time of Mr.
Ebmeyer's work injury and that Mel Beagley was the corporation's owner. Under these facts, Mr.
Ebmeyer's claim is against the corporation, rather than against Mr. Beagley as an individual.
2 Pursuant to §34A-2-704 of the Act, the UEF assists in paying benefits to injured workers whose
employers are insolvent, in receivership, or are otherwise unable to pay benefits.
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In requesting review of Judge Sessions' decision, Pinnacle argues it does not meet § 34A-2103(7)'s definition of a statutory employer. Pinnacle also argues that, even if it is Mr. Ebmeyer's
statutory employer, Platinum remains primarily liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits and Pinnacle is
only secondarily liable for those benefits.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Appeals Board finds the following facts material to Pinnacle's motion for review. The
Appeals Board also adopts Judge Sessions' findings of fact to the extent they are consistent with this
decision.
Pinnacle is a Utah corporation in the business of building and then selling new residential
houses. The corporation consists of three individuals who are its officers and owners. Apart from
these three officers, Pinnacle has no employees. It contracts with other companies and contractors to
do the actual work necessary to build its houses.
At the time Pinnacle started doing business, its insurance agent advised the company that it
could exclude its officers/owners from workers' compensation coverage, in which case the company
would have no employees and would not require workers' compensation insurance. Based on this
advice, Pinnacle did not purchase workers' compensation insurance. However, Pinnacle did not
submit written notice to its insurance carrier of its intent to exclude corporate officers from workers'
compensation coverage.
Platinum, also a Utah corporation at the time of Mr. Ebmeyer's accident, was in the business
of installing roofs on houses. Pinnacle engaged Platinum to do the roofing on several houses
Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs. Platinum in turn hired Mr. Ebmeyer to work as a roofer
on one of those houses. Platinum did not purchase workers' compensation insurance.
On August 11,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer was completing the roof of the house in question when he
accidentally fell and suffered the serious injuries. He now seeks workers' compensation benefits for
those injuries.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers to provide
workers' compensation benefits to employees injured in work-related accidents. None of the parties
challenge Judge Sessions' determination that Mr. Ebmeyer is entitled to workers' compensation
benefits for his injuries or Judge Sessions' determination that Platinum is liable for those benefits.
However, Pinnacle argues that Judge Sessions erred in concluded that Pinnacle is also liable for
those benefits as Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer under §103(7)(a) of the Act. The material
provisions of §103(7)(a) are as follows:
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for
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the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or
control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, the
contractor [and] all persons employed by the contractor... are considered employees
of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter . . . .
Pinnacle argues that because it had no employees, it was not an employer. Consequently, it
falls outside the scope of §103(7)(a), which is specifically limited to those entities who are
employers. The Appeals Board agrees that §103(7)(a) applies only to employers. Under the
circumstances of this case, Pinnacle's status as an employer depends on whether its corporate
officers are employees for purposes of the workers' compensation system.
Section 34A-2-103(2) of the Act defines "employer" as ". .. each person . .. who regularly
employs one or more workers or operatives in the same business . . . under any contract of hire
"
Section 104(4)(c) of the Act specifically provides that "[a] director or officer of a corporation is
considered an employee . . . until the notice described in Subsection (4)(b) is given."
The notice requirements of §104(4)(b) are as follows (emphasis added): "If a corporation
makes an election under Subsection (4)(a) [to exclude a corporate officer or director as an
employee], the corporation shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the
persons to be excluded from coverage."
Consequently, unless Pinnacle complied with the notice requirements of §104(4)(b), its
officers must be considered employees and Pinnacle must be considered an employer. Furthermore,
corporations must strictly comply with §104(4)(b)'s requirements for exclusion of officers and
directors from coverage. In Olsen v. Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.3d 257 (Utah 1998), the Utah
Supreme Court considered an earlier version of § 104(4)(b). The Court stated:
This court construes workers' compensation statutes liberally in favor of
finding employee coverage. In Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah
1990), we stated, "It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the
Workers' Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when
statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction." . . . . Allowing exclusion of
a director from coverage on the basis of constructive notice would be to construe the
Workers' Compensation Act liberally against coverage. This we will not do. We
find that constructive notice is not a substitute for the written notice required by
section 35-l-43(3)(b).
In order to exclude its corporate officers as "employees," §104(4)(b) required Pinnacle to
serve its insurance carrier3 with a written notice naming the persons to be excluded. Pinnacle did not
3 In the context of § 104(4)(b) specifically and the Utah Workers' Compensation Act generally, this
reference to "insurance carrier" must be understood as referring to the employer's workers'
compensation insurance carrier, and not to a provider of some type of unrelated insurance coverage.
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provide such notice. Consequently, Pinnacle's officers remained employees and, for that reason,
Pinnacle remained an employer. As an employer, Pinnacle is subject to the statutory employer
provisions of §103(7) and is liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's workers' compensation benefits.
Pinnacle argues that even if it is Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer, its liability for his
benefits is secondary to Platinum's liability. Pinnacle's argument continues that Mr. Ebmeyer must
first seek his benefits from Platinum before he can compel Pinnacle to pay any benefits. Pinnacle
does not cite any authority for this argument, which runs contrary to the plain language of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act. As already noted, both Platinum and Pinnacle are Mr. Ebmeyer's
employers and, as such, they are each liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits. While it may be true that
Pinnacle may obtain reimbursement from Platinum for any benefits Pinnacle pays, Mr. Ebmeyer is
entitled to obtain payment from either or both of his two employers.
ORDER
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board affirms Judge Sessions' decision and denies
Pinnacle's motion for review. It is so ordered.
Dated this Jrf

day o:

CONCURRING OPINION
I concur in the result. However, I am disturbed by the majority's heavy reliance upon Section
34 A-2-104(4). Pinnacle is a corporation whose only employees, within the meaning of § 104(4), are
directors and officers. By enacting this section, the Utah Legislature has clearly established the
public policy that certain limited, corporate employees maybe exempt from workers' compensation
coverage. However, it is impossible for a corporation similarly situated as Pinnacle to comply with
the notice requirements of § 104(4)(b) because Pinnacle has no insurance carrier to notify, in writing,
of Pinnacle's desire to exempt its' officers and directors from coverage and as "employees' under the
Act. The majority's decision possibly creates a strange option for corporations such as Pinnacle;
they could either send a written notification to any workers' compensation insurance carrier which
essentially says "thanks, we chose you as our insurance carrier, but we do not need workers'
compensation coverage because we are electing to exempt all our officers and directors, which are
our only employees, from coverage", or these corporations may have to resign themselves always to
being "employers" under §103(7)(a).
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Instead, I believe that facts in this case support the conclusion that Pinnacle acted as a general
contractor with sufficient supervisor control that the subcontractors became employees of Pinnacle
and Pinnacle is therefore an "employer" pursuant to §103(7)(a). Had Pinnacle desired to insulate
itself from workers' compensation liability under the Act, it could have retained an independent
general contractor which had appropriate workers' compensation insurance coverage.

JosAffti E. Hatch

~~~

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Glen
M. Ebmeyer, Case No. 03 -0919, was mailed first class postage prepaid this £$ day ofJttryT20p6, to
the following:
(Xutucd^
Glen M. Ebmeyer
330 N 800 W Apt 12
Salt Lake City UT 84116
Platinum Builders
Box 1384
RivertonUT 84065
Pinnacle Homes Inc
479W300N
American Fork UT 84003
Uninsured Employers Fund
160 E 300 S 3rd Fl
Salt Lake City UT 84114 '
Timothy Allen, Esq.
350 S 400 EN 113
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Theodore Kanell, Esq.
136 E S Temple Ste 1700
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Barry N Johnson, Esq.
3865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300
Salt Lake City UT 84109

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

Theodore E. Kanell (1768)
Andrew M. Wads worth (9517)
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, PC
Attorney for Respondent Pinnacle Homes Utah, Inc.
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801) 363-7611

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PINNACLE HOMES INC.,
PETITION FOR REVIEW
Petitioner,
v.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION;
PLATINUM BUILDERS/MEL BEAGLEY
and/or UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND;
and GLEN M EBMEYER,

Appeal No.
Agency Decision No. 2003919

Respondents.
Notice is hereby given that PINNACLE HOMES INC., Petitioner, petitions the Utah Court
of Appeals to review the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by the respondent
on March 24, 2005, and the Order Denying Motion for Review entered by the respondent on August
29, 2006. Petitioner seeks review of the entirety of both Orders.
Petitioner request the court to direct the respondent UTAH LABOR COMMISSION to
prepare and certify to the court its entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and
evidence taken in this matter.

Respectfully submitted this Z& — day of September, 2006,
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, PC

Theodore E. Kanell
Andrew M. Wadsworth
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the
day of September, 2006,1 faxed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing PETITION FOR REVIEW to the following:
Attorney for Glen M. Ebmeyer
Timothy C. Allen
350 South 400 East, #113
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Platinum Builders
David J. Holds worth
9125 S Monroe Plaza Way, Suite C
Sandy, UT 84070
Barry N. Johnson
3-865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Uninsured Employers Fund
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Allen L. Hennebold
Utah Labor Commission
PO Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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